6=SimHei's Research on Local Government Debt from the Perspective of Fiscal Decentralization Gong Qiang Wang Junjia, Abstract This paper analyzes the relevant theoretical analysis and empirical research on the influence of local government debt on the cause of local government debt under the framework of fiscal decentralization. Summarize the more mature financial federal economy in the practice of local debt management, and finally settled on China's local government debt. China’s local government debt problem and the imperfect tax sharing system are not perfect. Local officials’ incentives to distort the local financing platform’s non-standard macro-control and fiscal policy needs are more complicated. It is necessary to combine the existing research with the Chinese real system. The characteristics are advanced and the research is carried out in depth.
In order to establish an initial understanding of the local government debt problem, we can make a simple comparison between the government department and the private sector financial sector. In the private sector, economic entities and households may be borrowed for reasons such as lack of liquidity, fluctuations in income and expenditure, etc. In an economic environment full of uncertainty, it is normal and inevitable to borrow. However, in a free market economy environment, the lenders of funds will restrict the borrowers through the interest rate of borrowing and the amount of borrowing. The liabilities without long-term income support will not exist systematically. The private economic sector is the overall balance in the long run. In the financial sector, the role of financial intermediation must be able to play. It must rely on the financial institution's sustained debt ability. Liabilities are an active function. However, there is a greater debt risk in the continuous debtor sector. This potential risk makes society necessary. Through the legal market competition. Institutional supervision of industry norms and internal control to constrain the financial institutions' liabilities, so as not to cause systematic adverse impacts on economic operations.
As far as debt is concerned, the government is different from the above two departments.
On the other hand, the Duhui needs the government's role in providing public goods. When the tax revenue cannot meet the government expenditure, the government debt financing is a supplementary means. On the other hand, the government has a fundamental difference from the private sector and the financial sector. The government is a public power in the Duhui. The only legal owner of violent authorities and currency distribution rights. When tax revenues are difficult to support fiscal expenditures or difficult to maintain government debt, the government can always solve the problem by issuing currency to ask whether this will lead to inflation, which is an implicit tax on economic individuals. The only cost that the government needs to pay is political cost. As long as this cost is not high enough to threaten social stability, government debt is more flexible than the private and financial sectors. Progress, specifically to local governments, is not only the agent of public finance in the local economy, but also reluctantly in the national government departments, the Institute of Economics and Management of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, and the National Development Research of Beifang University. Institute, zip code 610074, e-mail 98, 98, 1. Wang Jun, School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics, postal code 10008 e-mail å²£ 18881., out; Jia, Peking University National Development Institute, postal code 10087 e-mail 314. This article is the phased result of the 2009 National Natural Science Foundation project approval number 70903079 and the 2010 National Natural Science Foundation project approval number 71040007; at the same time, this paper also won the 2008 Ministry of Education New Century Excellent Talent Support Program project 018857 Research funding from the research and innovation team of the Central University of Finance and Economics. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable ideas, and of course the responsibility.
The existence of sub-institutions Therefore, how to ensure that local governments have sufficient debt funds outside the taxation to ensure the needs of local public expenditures, and at the same time impose reasonable restrictions on the potential excessive expenditure of local governments, which is the financial practice and theory of local governments. The basics of the study asked the basic views of local government debt issues. Subsequently, the first part introduced intergovernmental transfer payments and discussed the practical experience of leading local governments to over-accumulate local governments in restricting local government borrowing and local government's evasion of debt management. And the empirical research on the actual effects of local debt management is sorted out. In the first part, we pay attention to the special characteristics of local government debt in the transition economies, as a transition, we are in the sixth part of China’s local government debt. Asking the study of local government debt under the framework of the fiscal federal theory Under the planned economy, the economic decisions of government departments are centralized by the central government, and the financial autonomy of local governments is basically lost. Only when the central government delegates part of the financial autonomy to the local government can local governments have the possibility of fiscal imbalances and debt financing. Therefore, local government debt is naturally embedded in economies that implement fiscal decentralization or fiscal federalism. Under the framework of fiscal decentralization, the budgetary constraints faced by local governments can be financed by the following fiscal expenditures. From the order of behavior, the right side of the equation is the relevant incentives for the left side of the equation and the debt constraint. Financial expenditures make decisions. Therefore, the discussion of local government debt is basically based on the interaction between the various items in the above accounting equations. In this part, we first remove the transfer payment on the right side of the equation or treat it as given. In the first part, we introduce the intergovernmental fiscal imbalance and the budget soft constraint into the discussion. The main contribution of the first generation of fiscal federal theory, such as 1959, 31972, etc., is that it is more effective to provide public goods through a multi-level government system than to make decisions on all public expenditures by a single central government. On this basis, the classic fiscal federal theory holds that under certain conditions, it is preferable to use local government borrowing to finance local investment projects than to use local fiscal revenues in the current period. Swianirv.viz2004Worldliank2004SgTTK reasons to support local government borrowing behavior is not in line with the principle of intergenerational equity.
It may be more economical for the local economy to finance public investment through borrowing in the process of accelerating development, and the operating costs of public services will be lower.
Even if the inter-period local fiscal revenue and fiscal expenditure can match, the cash flow and expenditure of local fiscal revenue may not be completely synchronized in the specific fiscal year, and there may be a fiscal deficit in the local area, due to the same fiscal surplus in the future. Opportunities and borrowing financing provide local governments with a smooth and temporary way to close the gap.
Allowing local governments to finance deficits by borrowing helps to promote accountability to local governments, which is also the most important point from the first generation of federal federal theory, because local governments can no longer count on central financial assistance at least beforehand. It is necessary to maintain the fiscal deficit through borrowing. At this time, the lenders in the lending market will decide the amount of borrowing and the interest on the loan according to the local government's past. If the local government wants to reduce its own borrowing costs, it must pay attention to maintaining the fiscal. Balance and good financial management, however, to make the local government's fiscal accountability mechanism work, can not be established by simply giving local governments the right to borrow. Due to the existence of intergovernmental transfer payments, the local government's debt incentives will be distorted. The local government debt system will be designed because of the soft constraint between the intergovernmental fiscal imbalance budget and the local government debt under the first fiscal federal theory. The logic of power is different in 2004. At the same time, the local economic development level of different regions has different factors such as the per capita income of public resources and the cost of public expenditure. If the local finance is completely financed by local taxation and local government borrowing, the question can be equalized by finance, 3169 Xian 1280 To improve, that is, to reduce the fiscal gap between different regions through intergovernmental transfer payments. The government's fiscal deficit can be offset by transfer payments from higher levels of government. The so-called vertical fiscal imbalance will occur with the phenomenon of 31 to 1306. The extreme form is that the local government's tax can't maintain the debt, so the central government has to be forced to use the state finance to bankrupt the local government. The vertical fiscal imbalance will generate public pool resources. 0 melon 0! 0, 0 rainbow. 6,8 vs. 0 claws, 1990 and the budget soft constraint 3,1 with a cost such as 1 plus 31 public pools stemming from the cost and benefit of public expenditure does not match.
If the public investment only benefits the residents of a particular area, but at the same time it can invest with national financial resources, then the region only needs to bear a small part of the cost of public investment, and this incomplete expenditure responsibility will In the case of excessive local expenditures, different regions will compete for the public domain of the central financial resources. Competition may have multiple forms. The most ideal situation is that different regions win the project quality; in the worst case, It is the local government that forced the central government to help through a large fiscal deficit. Heart, 999 provides a good discussion and review of the relevant literature. Another reason for the public pool is the overlapping of the central and local governments under the fiscal tax system. . 1.å©13. In this case, when the tax policy of a certain level of government has an impact on the private sector, the response of the private sector will affect the taxation of other levels of government. Therefore, there is an externality between different levels of government sharing the tax base. Local governments will compete for competition with higher-level governments for financial resources based on observations of countries such as China and Russia. If the tax is collected by the local government, the budget management is mainly The central government has established that local competition may even make local governments interested in helping companies avoid central taxation and regulation.
The budget soft-constrained question originated from the government in the planned economy. The support for state-owned enterprises made the state-owned enterprises moral hazard. 986, but then this concept was widely used in other federal budget soft-constraints. Federalism, the federal government has strong incentives to provide assistance for local public spending.
Xin 997 pointed out that the expectation of central government assistance makes local governments more inclined to invest their own financial funds to public expenditures that will only benefit local residents, while spillover public goods investment is reserved for central government funding, especially when it is a certain area. When the national economy is in a big position that does not fall, the question becomes particularly serious, and there are incentives for excessive borrowing and fiscal expenditures, and less attention is paid to the quality of investment projects. If the central government can Make a credible commitment beforehand, knowing that even if the place is in financial crisis, it will not help, then the question of soft budget constraints will not exist. However, the promise of hard budget constraints in the short term and the central government's goal is not that the local government bankruptcy may lead to the failure of public schools to close social security payments, which has greater political costs for the central government; It is interesting to encourage the region that is in financial crisis. The soft budget constraint does not necessarily lead to excessive spending and debt accumulation by local governments. Because local governments increase public expenditures, the central government’s financial Resources will eventually be balanced in the future through local taxation. If the central government increases financial support for over-expenditure areas and increases financial support for other areas that do not overspend, this is a punishment for over-expenditure areas. It is the central government's strategy that is dynamic and therefore credible. In 2002, it can be seen whether fiscal decentralization will lead to local government fiscal distortions depending on the situation and needs to be combined with macroeconomic management. Whether laws and regulations improve the local government debt management regulations and other factors to comprehensively consider the management constraints on local government debt and the crisis to rescue local government debt restrictions. As pointed out in the previous two sections, local government debt is generated by fiscal revenue and expenditure gaps, but The balance of payments gap is in turn the result of local government choices based on debt constraints and incentives from superior funding. Therefore, in order to effectively manage local government debt, so that it can play a positive role in promoting local public finance under the fiscal decentralization system, each country has adopted some policy measures. For large-scale market constraints, central direct control rule management and negotiation management In Canada, Sweden, the United States and other countries, the capital market itself will constrain the local government's borrowing behavior. In these countries, local governments can make borrowing decisions more autonomously, including the total amount of borrowing, the source of financing, and the investment destination of borrowing. Local governments will take the initiative to impose financial constraints on themselves in order to establish a good financing reputation in the lending market. 1993 pointed out that market constraints must be effective and require corresponding institutional foundations. First, domestic financial markets must be free, open and perfect, and the government cannot prioritize borrowers by regulating or intervening in financial intermediaries. status. Secondly, the local government's information on outstanding loans and repayment ability must be disclosed to investors in a timely manner. The central government can have a credible square. Finally, the local government can have a special department responsible for the transmission of market information to the borrowing policy. In the country, the central government will directly control the borrowing of local governments. Such direct control may take many forms, such as controlling the total amount of borrowing by local governments on an annual or shorter time window to control Lithuania; prohibiting external borrowing by local governments. Mexico reviews and supervises local government borrowing in Bolivia, India; The loan was first concentrated by the central government and then borrowed from Latvia to all levels of government. Indonesia.
The central government’s direct control over local borrowing is that the strict government’s budgetary expenditure is supported by the central government. In fact, the central government provides invisible financial guarantees for the local government, which will lead to soft budget constraints. This will make the question more serious. In addition, because the central government lacks information on local investment projects and the public goods needs of residents, local governments may choose the projects most favored by the central government in order to successfully pass investment projects and loan applications, rather than based on investment returns and project risks. The reason why the choice of asymmetry is the reason why the central government directly controls local borrowing can not achieve good results. In addition to direct control, the central government can also manage local debt operations through laws and regulations. The indicators governed by the rules include the local fiscal deficit ceiling, and the geographical advantage of Spain. The local government solvency index is based in Brazil and South Korea. The local debt accumulation ceiling is Hungary. Local public expenditure levels Belgium, Germany, etc. 1, 0, the advantages and disadvantages of rule management are obvious, because the rule management is more clear and transparent. Easy to operate and easy for investors to control, can reduce the negative impact of budget soft constraints 14,1997.
8 found in 2000 In the United States, local government spending cap management has had a significant impact on reducing government spending. On the other hand, rule management lacks flexible space. When the economy encounters external shocks, it is difficult to use fiscal policy to alleviate the difficulties of economic downturn and unemployment. If rule management is only aimed at the overall budget balance, local governments may maintain a balanced budget. Financial expenditures will be transferred between recurrent expenditures and capital expenditures, resulting in one of the insufficient expenditures, 13 digested; 1 provides a case study for this. In addition, if rule management does not take into account extrabudgetary projects or has half Government-type units such as local state-owned enterprises, then local liabilities may be transferred from the budget to the extra-budgetary and gradually accumulate. For example, in 1982, Australia relaxed the financing management of local semi-government institutions, and the debts of local public enterprises were In the two years, it has doubled, and eventually forced the government to re-limit it in 14 years. This model of government debt management exists in Australia and some European countries. Under this model, the central government and local governments will conduct ongoing consultations on local debt issues, and through discussion, encourage local governments to take into account the local economic development and the overall macroeconomic stability of the country. The distinction between different regions and the provision of fixed space negotiation management is that it compromises several other models. By organizing government dialogue at all levels, this model can achieve macroeconomic stability more effectively, while maintaining flexibility to deal with external shocks. However, in the case of improper operation, this model may weaken the central government's transfer payments. Bargaining, fiscal policy is slow to respond to economic changes in order to coordinate the interests of all parties. If these questions are generated at the same time, the local government's evasion of borrowing restrictions will restrict the local government's borrowing. In turn, local governments will adopt measures to evade. Debt constraint. Often local governments use extra-budgetary financing to circumvent their borrowing controls, which is common in both developed and developing countries.
For example, in Germany, in the early 1990s, local governments began to allocate some of the local financial functions services through the establishment of independent budget public utilities. The borrowing of these newly established public entities was not counted. In the local government's fiscal statistics, Failier, 2002 local governments can also use local state-owned enterprises to finance. In Australia, due to the economic prosperity driven by the resource economy in the late 1970s, the federal government accepted the state government's efforts to increase the borrowing of local state-owned enterprises. Request for financing of the facility. As a result, from 1977 to 383, the debt of local state-owned enterprises doubled, and the financing method that eventually forced the Federal Loan Committee to re-sell the loans of the state-owned sector and then lease back was also a common method used by local governments to bypass the control of borrowing. In Denmark, In order to finance public expenditures, local governments have used fixed assets such as schools and government office buildings as a place for sale and leaseback. The liquidity that must be obtained must be deposited into the bank for at least ten years. This rule not only did not prevent local government's leaseback financing, but instead, the local government immediately invested the funds in long-term bonds and supported the expansion of local finance through investment income. This policy has the effect of the central government. The definition of borrowing was revised, and the financing method of sale and leaseback was also included in the scope of management. Only the empirical research scholars of this local government debt management model conducted empirical research on the actual effects of the different local government debt management models = Ding 1813131997 Through case analysis, it is pointed out that in the management of local government debt, it is difficult to achieve success because of market constraints alone. Because of the transparency and credibility of the policy, rule management is preferable to direct administrative control. Xin, Kskelaml2003's case study pointed out that if the central government wants to effectively manage local government debt, it must implement strong administrative management, or have perfect market constraints. On the contrary, 2002 reviewed the experience of some European countries and found that The decentralized government system can achieve financial stability in a variety of ways. The empirical results of local government borrowing constraints on local fiscal results are not clear. Some studies have found that local governments have average debt levels of local governments in borrowing-bound economies. Higher VonHagen Eichengreen, 1996, but it is also well documented that the lack of local government borrowing constraints can lead to a significant increase in local fiscal deficits, 33, 2002. Other studies have not found a systematic impact of borrowing constraints on local fiscal deficits. 1 commit 61al., 200; jiniVZou, 2002SiiiIiiVPlckliinm2005 uses panel data from 44 countries in 4822 to regress, and identifies the impact of different local government borrowing management models. It concludes that there is no local government borrowing management model. In any case In other models, the local government's response to the debt crisis should include both short-term and long-term. In the short-term, the central government can help the local government through debt restructuring or financial assistance, but if the central bailout is limited to Short-term measures, then due to soft budget constraints, local government debt problems will still be in trouble again in the long run. Therefore, in order to effectively and effectively manage local government debt, it is necessary to cooperate with long-term countermeasures. In order to summarize the long-term management measures of the class, the local financial arrangements can be adjusted. While the local government is in debt restructuring, the central government can adjust the fiscal relations between the governments and increase local finance. Revenue ratio or reduction of local fiscal expenditure responsibilities, so that the local financial situation has improved, Brazil is! In the four-year local government debt restructuring plan, in addition to the reduction of local government debt, restrictions on local debt management have been added, local taxes have been increased, and local expenditure responsibilities have been reduced.
The more moderate way for the central government to directly intervene in local finance is to warn the higher-level government about local fiscal imbalances and require local governments to strengthen fiscal management. The more stringent measures are the direct takeover of local financial management by the central government; the US federal government in Washington DC in 1995. And Ohio’s regulation of municipal finance is that two such countries solve local debt problems by placing local government debt crises in the judicial sector. This is the case that the central government will not implement bankruptcy assistance for local governments. Confidence in the United States introduced the state and local government bankruptcy procedures in the law in 1937, through the courts to coordinate the interests of local government creditors local residents and government regulators, transforming local government debt in the economy, asking the central planning economy system The ills made the former planned economy transform into a market economy and fiscal decentralization system at the end of the 20th century. With the imperfection of the mature financial system, the local government debt problem may be more severe.
The first is the increased pressure on local fiscal expenditures. Along with the degree of the country, some of the public expenditure responsibilities originally undertaken by the central government gradually subsided to local governments at all levels. Due to the rapid urbanization, the central government plans not to allocate funds, and the infrastructure construction of the transition economies often brings huge financing pressures in another aspect of decentralization reform, economies of scale. The existence of factors such as factors of production factors and export tax rebate makes the tax base that can be effectively controlled by local governments after the reform more narrow, and the increase in public revenues for public revenues other than tax revenues, and administrative fees for public utilities income is very limited. Together, these factors have led to the inability of local governments to increase their fiscal revenues in proportion to their fiscal expenditures. 1 Such as 1.1996, the local government’s fiscal deficit and the pressure to finance public expenditure through borrowing with fiscal decentralization Reform and increase Willisin, 1996; deMello, 2000 At the same time, the local fiscal financing methods adopted by the developed countries that implement the federal system are often difficult to use in the transition countries to use the financial subsidies of the central government to distort local government financial decisions. Unpredictable special financial support has weakened the accountability mechanism of local governments; intergovernmental transfer payments are very unstable, making budget management of local long-term investment projects very difficult; foreign aid and investment often require domestic matching funds and abundant Project management capacity 4,1614, out, 2009; local government's tax base is not sufficient, raising the local tax rate will be more difficult to implement due to the resistance of local residents. In 2010, due to over-squeezing the local government's fiscal revenue capacity, the higher government It is also often divided by the proportion of some tax sources.
;1; 1997, and thus fiscal decentralization reform will also aggravate vertical fiscal imbalances, 1999.
Although both the fiscal expenditure pressure and the fiscal revenue tension will lead to strong demand from local governments for debt financing, in fact, the average debt scale of local governments in transition countries is usually not as high as that of developed countries. For example, in Central and Eastern Europe. In the countries with planned economies, the level of local government debt after transformation is much lower than that of other European countries. lcerToth, 2009 may be a possible reason for this situation, that policy makers and citizens who are used to planning economic thinking tend to DafiloniKBerilnth2004 The lack of government debt management capabilities and skills is an important factor in this situation. In addition, public utilities in the underdeveloped economy often lose money, which also makes local government debt financing difficult to sustain in the long-term 1 Xianshan 1997.
Promoting the sustainable development of local government debt financing in a transitional economy requires not only the technical factors of financial management, but also the grasp of macroeconomics, sound laws and regulations, restrictions on the use of complex financial derivatives by local governments, accounting auditing and finance. The introduction of information disclosure norms and standards, the construction of professional financial systems and indicator systems, and more importantly, the soft-factor policy makers who influence the development of local debt financing, financial managers and ordinary residents, etc. Attitude, 161 reverse, 2010. Especially after the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 and 2008, the special economy is more affected than the industrial countries. All parties will be more cautious about local governments entering the financial market. 31.,200. These studies show that although fiscal decentralization reform may bring many benefits, in the process of decentralization reform, policy makers must carefully design fiscal decentralization systems to ensure local public goods and public services. Effectively provide while avoiding central and local fiscal imbalances.
Six China's local government debt research Since the founding of New China, along with the development of social and economic systems, China's financial management system has also experienced different stages of development in the planned economy. In 1949, 1977, China mainly implemented highly centralized finance. The management system, although interspersed with several short-term reforms and opening up in the early period of 19781993, the financial management system and the national economic management system from the planned economy to the market economy, the implementation of the decentralized reform of the food and beverages, this period also This has caused the central government to have tight income. After the tax-sharing reform in 1994, China has become more standardized and reasonable, and has become more responsive to the market economy. However, new questions have gradually emerged and accumulated. Among them, local governments have financial constraints and debt accumulation.
The definition and dynamic structure of local government debt is different from that of many developed countries. For China, local government debt is first and foremost legally defined and still needs to be improved. At present, the current domestic laws and regulations on local government liabilities include the Budget Law Guarantee Law and the General Rules of Loans issued by the People's Bank of China. Wang Da used 20, 4 to review these laws and regulations from the legal point of view. For the interpretation of regulations and practical practice, leaving a certain space in reality, local government debts existed directly. Liu Shangxi Zhao Quanhou 2002 took the lead in trying to use the fiscal risk matrix proposed in 1998 to classify China's government debt, including explicit direct liabilities. Implicit direct liabilities are dominant contingent liabilities with implicit contingent liabilities, and the size of various types of government debt is estimated.
Gu Jianguang's 2006 progress cited this classification method for the classification of various local debts, mainly including the conversion of central government debt into local government debt. The central government's local government debts formed by the financial system factors of the local finance project loans, such as the arrears to the superiors and the government. Local public sector debt is transformed into local government debt. Local government debt due to moral obligation. Our local government debt is not only complicated in static composition, but also full of dynamic changes in structural characteristics. Before 2005, local government debt was mainly Due to the gap in fiscal revenue and expenditure, the contingent liabilities gradually surpassed the direct liabilities of Liu Shangxi. Zhao Quanhou, 2002, the scale of debt is large and the structure is scattered Liu Shangxi Meng Chun, 2,6. In terms of vertical distribution, the proportion of provincial government contingent liabilities is not high, and the more the government at the grassroots level has debt risk, the more prominent it is; At the same time, horizontally, the economic foundation is enriched and the government's financial resources are abundant. The size of the government's contingent liabilities is weaker than the economic base. The government's financial resources are tight. The local government's debts are mainly related to the financial difficulties of the county and townships. Yang Zhiyong Yang Zhigang, 2008 with urbanization The progress of the process and the relief of county and township financial difficulties The State Council began implementing comprehensive fiscal reform measures in 2005. Yang Zhiyong Yang Zhigang, 2008, some new changes in local government debt are the sharp increase in local debt scale; the formation of local debt begins with passive The debt expenditure turned into active debt financing, which was mainly changed from maintaining administrative expenditures to urban construction and infrastructure investment; the local debt relationship was more complicated, and the bilateral relationship between local governments and their creditors became local government government financing platform banks and Indirect financing relationship such as capital market, Hong Xiu, 20101. This The rapid accumulation of local debt is mainly attributed to the rapid expansion of local government financing platform. The development of local government financing platform and its risk. The so-called local government investment and financing platform refers to the local government and its departments and institutions through financial allocation or injection of land equity. Wei Jianing, an economic entity with the establishment of an asset-based financing system and an independent legal entity, has a brief review of the history of local financing platforms, and the local government’s financing platform has long been In the 1990s, it appeared in developed areas along the eastern coast of China, and it has developed more than 3,000 in the country. There is still no comparative research judgment on the scale of local government financing platform debt. According to the official data of the central bank, as of the end of May 2009, the total debt of the local government investment and financing platform reached 5.26 trillion yuan. Shen Minggao Peng Cheng 2, estimated the debt scale of the local financing platform from different angles, and estimated the estimated 7 trillion yuan for the local financing platform debt at the end of 20 continents; 2010 reported the government through an independent collection of political and financial agreements. The regulatory documents, debt rating reports and other information are estimated, and it is considered that the debt scale of local financing platforms is as of the end of 200. 4 trillion yuan, which is the highest value in all aspects of the current estimate. Even according to the most conservative estimates, the scale of local financing platforms has accumulated to a considerable amount as the actual medium for local government borrowing, and local financing platforms play a role. Huge role Qin Dean and Tian Jingyu 2010 pointed out that local Kang, Meng Yan 2009 believes that the standard local financing platform through the use of social savings funds, is conducive to promoting financial deepening, active banking credit system, and increase the speed of savings to investment conversion, there are Facilitating the reform and optimization of the national investment and financing system. Feng Beilin pointed out that compared with individual projects, the financing platform has much greater ability to resist risks, and can realize the market-oriented operation of local government public construction functions and effectively stimulate social investment. In the early stage of its development, local investment companies can be regarded as financial innovations that circumvent the current system constraints. 713,2, but after 2008, China implemented a proactive fiscal policy and moderately loose in response to the international financial crisis. Monetary policy, in this environment, the development of financing Some new changes have been made, mainly because the number of platform companies under the local government at the same level has increased rapidly; the number of platform companies at the district and county level has exceeded the provincial and prefecture levels, and they have begun to take up a large proportion; The government platform became active, and the superiority of Wei Weining, behind these images in 2010, a large number of illegal operations and inefficient investment have appeared Wei Jining, 2010; Zhang Yanhua, 2010; Zhang Guoyun, 20, the rapid expansion of local investment companies exist The risk is that the lack of main business and sufficient fixed assets while carrying a high debt ratio of the financing platform company has a high risk of repayment. Liu Yuhui, Zhang Yucheng, 2010; is the opaque financial management of the financing platform leads to information asymmetry, making the bank Risk assessment and post-lending management of financing platform projects have become more difficult. Shen Minggao Pengcheng, 201; is due to the fact that the financing platform projects are concentrated in medium and long-term projects with long-term capital requirements and long-term short-term assets and liabilities. Mismatching makes the credit risk and liquidity risk of the banking system increase, etc., 2009
Shi Hongxiu 2010 believes that China needs to consider more macro-level risks caused by the accumulation of debts from local financing platforms. These risks may include the squeeze of the central government's macro-control policy space; China's development strategy to adjust the industrial structure transformation and development mode The difficulty of implementation has increased; the pace of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises has been hampered; the government's credit has been damaged, which has affected the establishment of China's socialist market economic system; the country's money supply stability and money supply initiative have been threatened. Xu Chenggang also noted that the basic risk of current local financing platform debt is that local financing with high leverage ratio supported by future land expected value is highly dependent on the central government's land control policy, which brings the bank and financial system to the bank.æžå¤§çš„风险æ¤å¤–，许æˆé’¢2010å°†ä¸å›½åœ°æ–¹æ”¿åºœçš„èžèµ„å¹³å°è¿™é‡‘èžåˆ›æ–°ä¸Žå¼•å‘美国金èžå±æœºçš„金èžåˆ›æ–°å’Œè¯åˆ¸åŒ–进行了类比，指出其èžèµ„机制虽有区别，但是在金èžåˆ›æ–°å¤æ‚化，债务责任转移和超越金èžç›‘管ç‰æ–¹é¢ä¸¤è€…具有相似性与æ¤ç±»ä¼¼ï¼Œæ²ˆæ˜Žé«˜ï¼Œå½ç¨‹2010认为，地方èžèµ„å¹³å°çš„债务快速积累是我国å®è§‚刺激政ç–çš„é‡è¦éƒ¨åˆ†ï¼Œè¿™ä¸Žæ¬§æ´²éƒ¨åˆ†å›½å®¶åˆºæ¿€æ”¿ç–引å‘的主æƒå€ºåŠ¡é—®è™½ç„¶çŽ°å½¢å¼ä¸åŒï¼Œä½†æ”¿ç–代价则是大åŒå°å¼‚。
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